The Dynamic Game Analysis of Managers’ Investment Volume of Innovation Project under Financial Constraint Condition
Authors
Meini Han, Fusheng Wang
Corresponding Author
Meini Han
Available Online November 2015.
- DOI
- 10.2991/emeeit-15.2015.70How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Innovation; financial constraint; dynamic game
- Abstract
Studying the reasons for the underinvestment of innovation project is a hot topic in corporate finance. Based on the study and analysis of dynamic models between investors and managers, this paper reveals that managers cut down the investment volume of innovation project under financial constraint condition; agency problem can enlarge the degree of underinvestment under financial constraint condition. These game results are also proved by examples.
- Copyright
- © 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Meini Han AU - Fusheng Wang PY - 2015/11 DA - 2015/11 TI - The Dynamic Game Analysis of Managers’ Investment Volume of Innovation Project under Financial Constraint Condition BT - Proceedings of the 2015 International conference on Engineering Management, Engineering Education and Information Technology PB - Atlantis Press SP - 361 EP - 367 SN - 2352-538X UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/emeeit-15.2015.70 DO - 10.2991/emeeit-15.2015.70 ID - Han2015/11 ER -