The Competition of Recyclers under the Take Back Legislation

DOI

10.2991/cisia-15.2015.230How to use a DOI?

Keywords

EPR; WEEE; reversechannel; competition; game theory

Abstract

As the amount ofWaste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE)increases, the qualified recycler with the high technology and expensive cost have few supply of waste appliances. To solve this situation, China implements a series of take back legislations based on Extended Producer Responsibility. We want to investigate the competition under the take-back legislations. To this end, we make competitive decision under take back legislations with social planner intervention as a two period stage between qualified and unqualified recyclers. Deriving and computing equilibria, the results show that if the subsidy is small, the unqualified monopoly the market. When the subsidy is moderate, the two recyclers are both in the market. When the subsidy is large, the qualified recycler monopoly the market.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Y.F Zheng
AU  - W.H Zhou
AU  - Z.B Zheng
AU  - Q. Wan
PY  - 2015/06
DA  - 2015/06
TI  - The Competition of Recyclers under the Take Back Legislation
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer Information Systems and Industrial Applications
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 857
EP  - 860
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/cisia-15.2015.230
DO  - 10.2991/cisia-15.2015.230
ID  - Zheng2015/06
ER  -