Development of Market-prestige Model for Project Supervision

DOI

10.2991/asei-15.2015.376How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Project supervision; Market-prestige model; Incentive mechanism

Abstract

The paper aims to investigate the incentive mechanism of project supervision organizers by using the market-prestige model. The results of two-stage game analysis indicated that the game process can be maintained at least two stages under asymmetric information. In Stage I, the efforts of project supervisors were motivated by the expectation of their job performance. In Stage II, the income of supervisors relied on the expectation of supervision performance in Stage I. The efforts of project supervisors were strictly over zero in Stage I with respect to their prestige. Hence, the prestige can be considered as parts of the explicit incentive contract in project supervision.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhongshan Lu
AU  - Shuping Yang
PY  - 2015/05
DA  - 2015/05
TI  - Development of Market-prestige Model for Project Supervision
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 International conference on Applied Science and Engineering Innovation
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1905
EP  - 1908
SN  - 2352-5401
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/asei-15.2015.376
DO  - 10.2991/asei-15.2015.376
ID  - Lu2015/05
ER  -