Game-theoretic Approach for Anti-corruption Policy Between Investigating Committee and Inspected Departments in China

DOI

10.2991/amsm-16.2016.103How to use a DOI?

Keywords

game theory; anti-corruption; investigation cost; corruption revenue

Abstract

Corruption is a hot social issue that governments and public are commonly concerned about. The damage of government's reputation, social inequities, resource allocation distortions and so forth caused by corruption are immeasurable. Chinese government takes anti-corruption as an important development planning, and pointed out that the establishment of a sound system for punishing and preventing corruption is a national strategy and top-level design. This paper established game analysis models to explore the equilibrium solution between the committee investigating corruption and the department being inspected, considering the costs and revenues of anti-corruption, in order to put forward some ideas on anti-corruption work from the perspective of game-theoretic approach. The results show that for the committee investigating corruption, anti-corruption range should be no less than two thirds and the capability to find out corruption should be higher than two thirds as well, or the department being inspected will still adopt corruption and the probability is C/2R.

Copyright

© 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yuan Song
AU  - Maoran Zhu
AU  - Hongwei Wang
PY  - 2016/05
DA  - 2016/05
TI  - Game-theoretic Approach for Anti-corruption Policy Between Investigating Committee and Inspected Departments in China
BT  - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Applied Mathematics, Simulation and Modelling
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 452
EP  - 455
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/amsm-16.2016.103
DO  - 10.2991/amsm-16.2016.103
ID  - Song2016/05
ER  -