The Optimal Design of Hotel Staff Incentive Compensation Contract under Turnover Rate

DOI

10.2991/ammsa-17.2017.51How to use a DOI?

Keywords

hotel Industry; the utility function; symmetric information; asymmetric information; turnover rate; salary design

Abstract

In this article, assuming the output of staff can be observed,we construct the principal-agent incentive model between staff and hotel based on utility maximization. The optimal incentive contract including staff turnover rate are respectively constructed under two cases: the staff's effective working time is symmetric information and asymmetric information. Then, it is discussed that how the turnover rate affects the incentive contract and the enthusiasm of staffs.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Mingyin Xiang
AU  - Li Li
PY  - 2017/05
DA  - 2017/05
TI  - The Optimal Design of Hotel Staff Incentive Compensation Contract under Turnover Rate
BT  - Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Applied Mathematics, Modelling and Statistics Application (AMMSA 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 235
EP  - 239
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/ammsa-17.2017.51
DO  - 10.2991/ammsa-17.2017.51
ID  - Xiang2017/05
ER  -