A Further Research on S-core for Interval Cooperative Games

DOI

10.1080/18756891.2015.1001953How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Interval cooperative game, S-core, balanced collection, minimal weak balanced interval cooperative game

Abstract

Interval cooperative game is a kind of model focusing on how to distribute the profit reasonably when payoffs of any alliance are interval numbers. In recent years, the existence and reasonableness of its solution have aroused widespread concern. In this paper, based on the conceptual analyses of various solutions of interval cooperative games, S-core is further researched. The concepts of weak balanced interval cooperative games and minimal weak balanced interval cooperative games are firstly proposed. The necessary and sufficient condition which guarantees S-core is nonempty is proven, furthermore, the inequalities can be simplified on the condition that the left endpoints of interval numbers satisfy the superadditivity. Then this paper analyzes the whole solution space of S-core and the solution method of S-core is converted into the method solving a linear programming problem. After that the concept of S-dominance core is put forward and the equivalent conditions of S-core and S-dominance core are proved. Finally, the reasonableness and validity of S-core are verified through a specific example.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dengyuan Xie
AU  - Fei Guan
AU  - Qiang Zhang
PY  - 2015
DA  - 2015/04/01
TI  - A Further Research on S-core for Interval Cooperative Games
JO  - International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems
SP  - 307
EP  - 316
VL  - 8
IS  - 2
SN  - 1875-6883
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1080/18756891.2015.1001953
DO  - 10.1080/18756891.2015.1001953
ID  - Xie2015
ER  -