# Research on the Rights of the Journalists in the Process of News Communication

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**Abstract.** The news in the process of transmission will not only bring information to readers, but also a place of rights, whose range is very wide. The journalists generate power through text, production sense and knowledge. News communication organizations generate rights by virtue of its position in the relationship and the relationship with other social authorities. The journalists generate rights through the communication channels and technology. The present paper tries to analyze the sources of the rights, the branches contained in this rights, and find the reasonable countermeasures to deal with different network news transmission based on the game theory, and then discuss the social responsibility of the news media in our country.

## Introduction

With the rapid development of economy since the reform and opening-up, the living standards of the people are increasing day by day. The development process of news communicator is from the single mode such as television, radio, newspapers to a thriving new media era, such as micro-blog, WeChat, the major portals, mobile client app, etc. The journalists tell the news to the public through their own work platform or the third party platform, and then achieve the purpose of advertising. Network is a new media of information dissemination, and the environment of information dissemination has a certain particularity so that there is a different preference for their own interests in the process of dissemination of information [1]. Therefore, the essence of journalists' behavior is in the interests of driving mechanism, they take spreading cost into account from different angles or for different purposes when they spread information, this is an interactive game between journalists and receivers. The spread of the news has not only real information, but also a lot of distortion information through the network, such as a variety of rumors [2]. The dissemination of information can bring different benefits to the journalists and the receiver. Rational people should find reasonable measures based on game theory to deal with the network information communication especially those journalists who are lack of credit.

In the process of news dissemination, it is bound to have a certain influence, we can also say that this influence is the rights of the media in the process of news dissemination. The present paper tries to analyze the sources of the right, the branches contained in this right, and find the reasonable countermeasures to deal with different network information transmission based on the game theory, and then discuss the social responsibility of the news media in our country.

## The Generation of Journalists Rights

**Through the Production of Knowledge to Produce Rights.** Whether it is through traditional media such as television, newspapers, radio, or new media such as WeChat, micro-blog, the major portals, mobile client app, etc., it will produce new knowledge in the process of news transmission. Especially in today's Internet age, different disciplines, different places and different kinds of news will be delivered to the audience on the first time by the phone [3]. Thus, the views of journalists will affect the audience's judgment on this matter, and then strong rights of the journalists will be reflected[4]. Of course, this influence, and even the right can mislead the audience. So, there were many news events which was focus on a lot of attention initially and later be clarified which was false. Also, there are a lot of reversal news. Such as "Southern China Tiger Photo event" is a typical

example, which made a noise in the world.

**The Journalists Produces Rights Through the Production of Value and Ideology.** In the news related theories, a more recognized view is that the author is the news value which is given by the journalists to meet the readers or the audience's inner value demand [5]. Of course, this demand is multifaceted with a variety of characteristics. The orientation of this kind of value is led by the journalists. Because to a large extent, we can say that the journalists are not simply stating the facts of the incident but the fact that it is in the perspective of the communicator. Even from a certain point of view, the production of the value is accompanied by each news. News production is not only the process of meaning and value production, but also the result. The way of media and official accounts to spread network news is shown in Fig.1.



Fig.1.    The way of media and official accounts to spread network news

## Materials and Methods

**The Premise to Analyze Network Information Transmission based on Game Theory.** *Network Virtualization.* Game phenomenon occurs mainly in the conflict of relationship and interests [6]. Virtualization of network information transmission in uncertain information condition makes "conflict" happen more likely, so there is the possibility of the game. And any person on the Internet may be the communicator of the information, and the cost of the spread of network information is also low.

*Sound Feedback Mechanism.* If the feedback mechanism is not smooth, even if there is a conflict in the process of information dissemination, the game can not happen [7]. But in the process of network information dissemination, the receiving party can actively use all kinds of channel feedback information, thus producing the game.

*Uncertainty of Information.* If the information is accurate and clear, there is no game. In the network information dissemination, in order to achieve their own interests information, communicators spread the processing information. then the receiver will speculate these information, and the behavior will result in the game.

**Basic Hypothesis.** Hypothesis 1: This article takes the network news communication as the research background. Two game models were established based on journalists which analyze the different personal preference of the various network news.

Hypothesis 2: In this paper, information mobility should be taken into account. The dissemination of information has the source and the purpose, and the destination of information dissemination can be the source of the next information dissemination [8].

Hypothesis 3: Nowadays, network news are facing a deluge of information, the problem such as the false ones. This paper assumes that credits are the condition of information dissemination when the information receivers can't judge true and false. The information receivers will forward information if they trust the journalists. Conversely, the information receivers will refused

forwarding information if they distrust the network news.

Hypothesis 4: The objects of this research are strangers. The credit value does not change over time. In this paper, the credit among the information receivers is divided into: trust absolutely, distrust absolutely and trust with a probability of p, and the credit is not affected by the value of credit.

**Construction of the Game Model (Model 1).** *The Description of the Game Model.* Participants: journalist *A* and journalist *B*(*A* knows the authenticity of the news and *B* can not verify the authenticity of the news). *A*' optional policy set is: {true information, untrue information}; *B*'s optional policy set is: {trust and forward, distrust and doesn't forward}.

The profits of *A* and *B*: The profits of *A* depends on the choice of *B*. If *B* trusts *A* and forward the news, the profits of *A* is a regardless the information is true or untrue. But, the profits of *A* is b if *B* doesn't trust *A* and doesn't forward the news(*a>b*). The profits of *B* depends on the authenticity of the news. If *B* rejects forwarding the news, the reputation value of *B* is unchanged which will be *s*. *B* 's reputation value of *B* will be *s+t*(*t>0*) if the news is true. Conversely, the reputation of *B* will be *s-t* if the news is untrue.

*Construction of the Game Matrix.* The game matrix between *A* and *B* is shown in fig. 2.

| A \ B | Trust and forward | Distrust and doesn't forward |
|---|---|---|
| True information | ( a,s+t ) | ( b,s ) |
| Untrue information | ( a,s-t ) | ( b,s ) |

Fig.2.  The game matrix between *A* and *B*

There has two equilibrium strategies: (True information, Trust and forward) and (Untrue information, Distrust and doesn't forward).

**The Improved Game Model(Model 2).** In the real life, for their self-interests, *A* and *B* neither hope the other one knows their optimal strategy. In the network, the receivers of news usually know nothing about the journalists, resulting in a random trust value to the strangers. Therefore, based on chapter 3.3, the improved model recommends the random trust value to form the mixed strategy of game parties.

Assuming that, q as the true probability of journalists *A*'s information, (1-*q*) as the false probability; then *p* is the probability of *B* to trust and forward it, and (1-*p*) as the probability of mistrusting and not forwarding it. Fig. 3 shows the improved game matrix between *A* and *B*.

| A \ B | | p | 1-p |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Trust and forward | Distrust and doesn't forward |
| q | True information | ( a,s+t ) | ( b,s ) |
| 1-q | Untrue information | ( a,s-t ) | ( b,s ) |

Fig.3.  The improved game model between journalists A and B

The expected return on the spread of true news for *A*:
$$\pi(1, p) = a * p + b *(1-p) = b + (a-b)\, p$$
The expected return on the spread of untrue news for *A*:
$$\pi(0,p)=a*p + b*(1-p)=b+(a-b)p$$

The expected return on the trust and forward of news for *B*:
$$\pi'(q,1)=2tq+s-t$$
The expected return on the distrust and not forward of news for *B*:
$$\pi'(q,0)=s$$

## Discussion

The expected return of the participants is related to the probability of the other party's matrix strategy. Regardless *B* spreads the news or not, the expected return on the spread of true or untrue news for *A* is the same: $(b + (a-b) p)$. Moreover, the greater the random trust value *p* of *B* to *A*, the higher return on *A*.

When the expected return $\pi'(q, 1)=\pi'(q, 0)$, and *q*=0.5, the return on *B* that trusts *A* and forwards the news will be equal to the return that *B* distrusts *A* and does not forward it. When 0.5 <*q* <1, the return on *B* that trusts *A* and forwards news will more than *B* mistrusts *A* and does not spread news. When 0 <*q* <0.5, the return on *B* that trusts *A* and forwards news will less than *B* mistrusts *A* and does not forward it. The yield curve of journalist *A* and *B* is shown in Fig.4.



Fig.4.    The yield curve of journalist *A* and *B*

## Conclusions

Model 1 is a purely strategic game model based on absolute trust and absolute distrust. It is applicable to the network information dissemination situation which has established a more explicit trust relationship through many interactions, such as unofficial websites (media) publish information. At the same time, Model 1 lays the foundations for the establishment of hybrid strategy of Model 2.

In model 2, the greater the random trust value of *A* to *B*, the higher the profit of *A* is. The random trust of the journalists is introduced into the model 2 making the Model 2 more in line with the situation of reality information dissemination. In the network information dissemination, the situation that the journalists and the receivers are unfamiliar to each other which determines that the receivers take certain probability to trust the journalists, rather than full trust, to obtain high returns, or a higher reputation.

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