



How to Bring Sanctions in Effect

An Analysis of Factors on Effectiveness of Multilateral International Sanction

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Abstract. According to the existing research on sanctions, the effectiveness of sanctions has a positive correlation with the establishment of sanctions alliance: the more countries participating, the more effective the sanctions are. Compared to unilateral sanctions, multilateral sanctions are more effective, and cooperation is more conducive to achieving the goals of sanctions. However, in quite some practical cases in reality, multilateral sanctions cooperation often fails to achieve its ideal goal, entailing the dilemma of multilateral sanctions failure on the contrary. The article argues that internal motivation can be analyzed from the dual logical interaction of cohesion factors of multilateral sanctions parties and sensitivity factors of sanctions targets to sanctions. The cohesion of multilateral sanctions depends on the influence of three variables: the differences in interests among the sanction subjects, the effectiveness of constraints within the sanction system, and the cognitive consistency among the subjects; the sensitivity of the sanctioned entity is related to three variables: the stability foundation of the sanctioned regime, external dependence, and measures to evade sanctions. On this basis, the article provides a theoretical explanation of the causal mechanism for the failure dilemma in multilateral sanctions cooperation, meanwhile making a scientific and reasonable explanation of effectiveness law of sanctions alliance based on the logical demonstration of the cohesion of the sanctioning party and the sensitivity of the sanctioning target country; the theoretical research on the effectiveness of sanctions is therefore enriched in this sense.

Keywords: Multilateral International Sanctions; Effectiveness of Sanctions, Cohesion Factors, Sensitivity Factors.

1 Introduction

In today's international relations, international sanctions generally refer to non violent coercive measures or punitive actions taken by countries or groups of countries to force a specific government entity to change its foreign policy and political stance. Since the 1990s, with the increasing number of multilateral sanctions in international sanctions, research on the effectiveness of multilateral international sanctions has begun to attract

people's attention. The common theoretical discourse on the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions is that the more sanction partners there are, the higher the effectiveness of sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions is positively correlated with the construction of sanction alliances, and the participation and cooperation of major countries are necessary conditions for the effectiveness of sanctions[1]. On the basis of theoretical foundation. The theory of cooperation assumes that a sufficient number of strong countries can cooperate to manage the international system and punish behavior that violates the rules of the game; The broad and consensus based support formed on this basis has the function of moral persuasion, providing the legitimacy of moral authority for sanction actions[2].

These mainstream paradigms regarding international sanctions can only provide explanations for the success of international sanctions, and cannot take into account failed cases. The purpose of this article is to explore the intrinsic factors that affect the effectiveness of multilateral international sanctions. Drawing on the concepts of cohesion in alliance management theory and sensitivity in interdependence theory, a theoretical analysis framework is constructed through the high-low interaction logic between the cohesion factors of multilateral sanctions and the sensitivity factors of sanctions targets to sanctions, in order to explain the intrinsic factors that affect the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions.

2 Analysis of the Explanatory Power of Cohesion and Sensitivity Factors

Among the existing theoretical studies on the effectiveness of international sanctions, on the one hand, the basic arguments focus on directly discussing the effectiveness of sanctions, that is, the functional results of international sanctions are evaluated and argued on this basis. For example, Galtung proposed the "naive" theory, which believes that sanctions are effective and uses this as an argument for argumentation. In contrast, the ineffectiveness of sanctions theory criticizes sanctions behavior, and there is also the effectiveness of sanctions modification theory. These theories are more about debating and explaining whether sanctions behavior is effective or not, and less about exploring the internal motivations behind the success or failure of sanctions behavior; on the other hand, some studies have provided relevant explanations on why sanctions are difficult to work or the necessary conditions for the success of sanctions, such as sufficient sanctions intensity, accurate subject and whether credible sanctions commitments can be met, which have become important factors affecting the effectiveness of sanctions[3].

However, these three necessary conditions are only part of the factors that affect the effective implementation of sanctions. A systematic overall logical analysis assumption framework has not been established between the factors to explore the motivations behind the effectiveness of sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions is affected by the people involved in the sanctions. The compliance and response of the people involved in the sanctions to the sanctions and the realization of the expected goals play a decisive role. The people involved in the sanctions include both the initiators and the sanctioned

parties. The relationships within the multilateral sanctions parties and the relationships between the parties and the sanctioned parties all affect the effective implementation of multilateral sanctions. Drawing on the interdependence theory and alliance management theory, this section attempts to propose a logical analysis framework that affects the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions, starting from the cohesion of the multilateral sanctions parties and the sensitivity of the sanctioned countries.

2.1 A Subsection Sample

The factor of cohesion involves the cooperation within the multilateral sanctions party, that is, within the sanctions alliance. The application of the cohesion factor mainly draws on the definition and explanation of the concept of cohesion in alliance management theory. In alliance management, how to manage and coordinate the relationship between the dominant country and the supporting country within the alliance and maintain the cohesion within the group runs through the whole process. The cohesion of the alliance can also be described as the cohesion within the group, which specifically refers to the degree of solidarity and cooperation between the members of the group under the constraints of common agreements, commitments or common interests to achieve the collective responsibilities, goals and tasks. The collective members in the concept include the leading countries and supporting countries within the multilateral sanctions party. The leading countries generally refer to those countries that play a dominant role in the alliance policies and alliance actions, and they determine the development direction, nature and cooperation mode of the alliance; supporting countries refer to those countries that voluntarily or forcibly join the alliance. Under the premise of alliance cooperation, these countries often cooperate with the leading countries to play a role and influence. The degree of solidarity and cooperation, that is, cohesion, is externally manifested in the trust, compliance and even obedience of the motivational behavior of individual members within the collective sanctions to the collective goals and tasks. Among them, the differences in interests among members of the alliance collective are the basis and key factor affecting the cohesion of the alliance. Of course, the trust between members in collective sanctions is reflected in the psychological basis of belonging such as the consistency of individual members' cognition and identity of collective sanctions, and obedience is reflected in the power coercion of the leader over the subordinate and the institutional constraints within the collective. Therefore, the cohesion of multilateral sanctions comes from the effective unity of interest coordination, identity and belonging, and constraint mechanism among the subjects.

2.2 Explanatory Analysis of Sensitivity Factors of Sanctions Targets

Sensitivity refers to the degree of perception of external changes, that is, the degree of easy or impossible perception. Keohane and Joseph Nye have made a special explanation of the concept of sensitivity - mainly referring to the degree to which an actor responds within a certain policy framework. This concept itself contains two elements: first, the policy framework involves the domestic political system and institutional arrangements of the actor; second, the degree of response of the country or the degree of

change made to cope with other countries is the main indicator for weighing the sensitivity of the country, which involves the ability of the actor to cope with sanctions and the avoidance measures taken. The root cause of the sensitivity problem lies in external dependence under the demand for power resources. Generally speaking, unlike vulnerability, which refers to the relative cost of alternative measures taken by the actor to deal with this event, sensitivity refers to the degree of response of the actor to the impact of an event, and this degree of response is related to the national strength or pressure resistance of the actor. In asymmetric interdependence, the greater sensitivity of one party means that it is in a disadvantaged position in the relationship between countries.

Combined with the above explanation of the concept of sensitivity, the sensitivity of the sanctioned country in this article mainly refers to the degree of response of the sanctioned country to the pressure of sanctions initiated by multilateral sanctions. This degree of reaction is closely related to the national ability of the target country to resist the pressure of sanctions. The higher the degree of reaction, the easier it is to perceive the pressure of sanctions and the more susceptible it is to the pressure of sanctions, which indicates that the country's ability to resist the pressure of sanctions is weak; on the contrary, in the face of multilateral sanctions, the target country's reaction is low and the impact of the pressure of sanctions is not easily perceived, which indicates that the country has a strong ability to resist pressure. The strength of a country's ability to resist the pressure of sanctions is mainly judged by the stability of the domestic political system of the target country, the degree of external dependence, and whether it adopts sanctions evasion measures.

3 An Analytical Framework of Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Multilateral Sanctions

Whether the international sanctions alliance can exert pressure on the sanctioned targets and thus promote the realization of their political goals, that is, the internal motivation that affects the effectiveness of the sanctions alliance, can be analyzed from the dual logical interaction of the cohesion of the sanctions alliance and the sensitivity of the sanctioned targets to sanctions. When the cohesion of the sanctions alliance and the sensitivity of the sanctioned targets are both low, the sanctions alliance will face the dilemma of sanctions failure; when the cohesion of the sanctions alliance is high and the sensitivity of the sanctioned targets is low, the sanctions alliance will exert less pressure on the sanctioned targets, the sanctions effectiveness is low, and the sanctions alliance will face the dilemma of time failure, and vice versa. There is only one ideal situation - when the cohesion of the sanctions alliance and the sensitivity of the sanctioned targets are both high, the multilateral sanctions cooperation of international sanctions will have a higher sanctions effectiveness.

3.1 Sanctions Cooperation and Sanctions Effectiveness

The level of cooperation within the multilateral sanctions parties, that is, the cohesion factor, affects the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions. Without considering the impact of the sensitivity of the target country on the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions, generally speaking, the higher the cohesion within the sanctions cooperation system, the stronger the role of multilateral sanctions can play, and the more it can achieve the political goals of multilateral sanctions; on the contrary, when the cohesion within the sanctions cooperation system is low, the pressure of sanctions initiated by the multilateral sanctions parties is weak, the political goals of sanctions are difficult to achieve, and sanctions face the dilemma of ineffectiveness. The main criteria for judging the level of cohesion within the multilateral sanctions cooperation system are the differences in interests between the multilateral sanctions cooperation parties, the power and institutional constraints within the sanctions system, and the psychological belonging of the consistent cognition and identity of the sanctions initiators[4]. Among them, the differences in interests and power constraints between the initiators of multilateral sanctions are the determining factors for judging the level of cohesion of sanctions cooperation.

3.2 Sanctions Evasion and Effectiveness

The national capacity of the target country to resist sanctions affects the sensitivity of the target country to sanctions, and the sensitivity is used as an independent variable to explain the internal reasons for the effectiveness of sanctions. Without considering the impact of the cohesive factors of multilateral institutions on the effectiveness of sanctions, when the national capacity of the target country to resist sanctions is strong, the target country can cope with the pressure of sanctions, the country is not sensitive to sanctions, and is not easily affected by external sanctions pressure, making it difficult for multilateral sanctions initiated by multilateral sanctions parties to play a role, and the political goals of sanctions are difficult to achieve, and multilateral sanctions face the dilemma of failure; conversely, when the national capacity of the target country is weak, the target country is difficult to resist external sanctions pressure, which means that the country is highly sensitive to sanctions, and the higher sensitivity makes the target country vulnerable to multilateral sanctions pressure, multilateral sanctions can play a role, and the political goals of sanctions are easier to achieve.

3.3 Analysis of the Effectiveness of Sanctions Under Four Assumptions

The main theoretical analysis framework of this paper mainly combines the two variables of cohesion and sensitivity to demonstrate, proposes four hypotheses, and establishes a logical causal mechanism that can explain the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions, and then explains the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions. When the cohesion of the multilateral sanction party and the sensitivity of the sanctioned country to sanctions are both low, the low internal cohesion of the sanction party is not enough to pose a threat pressure on the sanctioned target, and the sanctioned target itself has a high

evasion power to sanctions, which leads to the failure of multilateral sanctions; when the cohesion between the sanction cooperation subjects is low, but the sensitivity of the sanctioned target to sanctions is high, the sanctioned target has a weak resistance to sanctions and it is difficult to evade sanctions, and the sanctions face the problem of failure; similarly, the failure of multilateral sanctions under high cohesion and low sensitivity is mainly affected by the low sensitivity of the sanctioned target country to sanctions pressure; there is also an ideal situation assumption, that is, when the cohesion of the multilateral sanction party and the sensitivity of the sanctioned target country to sanctions are both high, the sanctions imposed by the sanction party can easily form sanctions pressure on the sanctioned target, forcing the sanctioned target to change its political behavior, thereby achieving the political goal of sanctions, and multilateral sanctions are successful[5].

As mentioned above, the high cohesion of multilateral sanctions is determined by the common security interests and the power constraints of the leading country. At the same time, institutional constraints and common cognitive foundations will also enhance the cohesion within the sanctions system. The loss of legitimacy, that is, the lack of the country's ability to regulate political order, and the characteristics of its economic development model that relies on the international market and strong external security needs, make it difficult for the country to cope with external threats and challenges. Therefore, under the combined effects of high cohesion and high sensitivity, sanctions work and the sanctions goals can eventually be achieved.

4 Conclusion

This article starts with the sanctions-related parties, namely, the multilateral sanctions-imposing parties and the target countries, to explore the internal motivations that affect the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions. It uses four hypotheses constructed based on the high and low relationship between the cohesion factor and the sensitivity factor to demonstrate whether multilateral international sanctions can put pressure on the sanctioned targets and thus promote the realization of their political goals. The contribution of this article is to try to use the four hypotheses under the influence of the two factors of the cohesion of the sanctions-imposing parties and the sensitivity of the target countries to sanctions to analyze the effectiveness of multilateral international sanctions based on political goals.

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