



“Three Distributions” Model of Team Incentive Compensation Innovative Application in Public Management

Take Multi-Sectoral Collaborative Public Governance of Tourism Market Rip-Off Behavior as an Example

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Abstract. This study explores the innovative application of the "three-distribution" model of team incentive compensation in the field of public management, taking the complex social problem of rip-off behavior in the tourism market as an example. By constructing the organizational structure of rip off governance and introducing the concept of "rip off governance integral", this study proposes a complete set of improvement programs, and uses simulation data to analyze its role in promoting the coordination between superiors and subordinates and between levels, the evaluation of governance situation and governance capacity, and individual job performance at both macro and micro levels. It provides a new perspective and tool for the development of public management theory and practice, and provides a useful reference for solving other complex social problems. Future research can further optimize the operation mechanism of the model and expand its application fields to meet the governance needs of more public management issues.

Keywords: Systematic Governance, Competition and Synergy, Quantitative Evaluation, Public Management Innovation, Team Incentive Compensation

1 Introduction

In public management practice, to significantly enhance governance effectiveness, it is crucial to strengthen close collaboration and cooperation among multiple departments. This study introduces the "three-tier allocation" model of team-based incentive compensation, aiming to construct a scientific and reasonable performance evaluation sys-

tem to stimulate the intrinsic enthusiasm and cross-departmental collaboration capabilities of governance personnel. Taking the specific and complex social issue of tourist market price gouging as an empirical research entry point, we not only elaborate on the specific application methods and expected effects of this model in promoting collaborative governance, but also delve into the potential challenges, constraints, and corresponding strategies in practical application. This provides new perspectives and valuable references for both the theory and practice of public management.

2 Research Status

In the field of collaborative governance and team motivation and performance research, several scholars have conducted in-depth explorations. Sun Dapeng has explored the theoretical framework and practical cases of so-cial collaborative governance, providing insights^[1]. Zeng Yu and Huang Huan fo-cused on digital collaborative governance, offering empirical references^[2]. Gao Xiang and Chen Hong constructed a "secondary distribution" index system for team performance, addressing incentives in family doctor teams' evaluation^[3]. Zhang Yanan and Ma Mingxiao proposed a "three-tier" incentive compensation distribution model to optimize the compensation structure and improve team performance^[4]. Rajalakshmi Subramaniam developed an information system to accurately evaluate individual performance in large teams^[5]. Dai, Debao, and his colleagues studied how the PLM system can enhance team performance^[6]. Cho, Hang-Soo, and his team found that different incentive systems and feedback mechanisms have a significant impact on job performance^[7]. Haynie, Jeffrey J., emphasized the importance of internal team communication in improving performance^[8]. Honeywell-Johnson, Judith A., explored the role of diverse incentive mechanisms in maintaining high team performance^[9]. These studies provide theoretical support and practical guidance for team management.

3 Improvement Scheme of Team Incentive Compensation “Three Distributions” Model in Rip-Off Governance

The application of the "three-tier allocation" model in the field of public management includes constructing an organizational structure, introducing the concept of "tourist market price gouging governance points", and incentivizing city-level, subordinate team, and individual performance through three-tier allocation to achieve system optimization and enhance personal enthusiasm. The specific steps, methods, and processes can be divided into the following several stages, as shown in Figure 1.




Fig. 1. Implementation Flowchart.

3.1 Focus on the First Distribution of the Overall Effectiveness of the City

Firstly, a two-tier organizational structure for tackling factors price gouging in the tourist market is established. The upper tier is a governance leadership group led by the municipal government, while the lower tier consists of multiple parallel frontline governance teams formed by personnel from various departments such as market regulation, tourism management, traffic management, consumer protection, public security, and urban management.

Secondly, clarify roles and responsibilities. The municipal leading group serves as the central decision-maker and manager of the entire governance system, responsible for coordinating the efforts of various subordinate governance teams, formulating overall governance strategies and objectives, and supervising implementation. Its primary duties encompass five key areas: First, strategic formulation, involving the creation of long-term and short-term overcharging governance strategies and goals based on the actual conditions of the city's tourism market. Second, organizational structure establishment, which entails constructing a two-tier overcharging governance framework consisting of the municipal leading group and subordinate governance teams, clarifying each team's responsibilities and collaboration methods. Third, point system design, introducing the concept of "overcharging governance points" and devising calculation methods, exchange rates, and allocation mechanisms for these points. Fourth, goal setting and evaluation, involving the collaborative establishment of governance objectives with subordinate teams, periodic assessments of each team's governance effectiveness, and adjustments to governance strategies and goals based on evaluation results. Fifth, resource allocation, providing essential resource support, including human resources, material resources, and financial resources, to ensure the smooth progression of governance efforts. The subordinate governance teams, composed of representatives from

various departments such as market regulation, tourism management, traffic management, consumer protection, public security, and urban management, are the entities responsible for executing specific governance tasks within their respective domains. Their duties primarily comprise five aspects: First, task execution, specifically implementing overcharging governance tasks, including but not limited to patrols, punishments, publicity, and education, based on the governance strategies and objectives formulated by the municipal leading group. Second, data collection and reporting, regularly gathering relevant data on the team's overcharging governance activities, such as spot check pass rates, the absence of overcharging incidents, tourist satisfaction, and complaint handling efficiency, and submitting these to the municipal leading group. Third, goal setting and feedback, establishing reasonable governance objectives based on the municipal leading group's suggested goals and the team's actual situation, and providing timely feedback on progress and encountered issues during implementation. Fourth, internal collaboration, maintaining close communication and cooperation among team members to ensure the overall advancement of governance efforts. Fifth, point competition and allocation, actively striving for more "overcharging governance points" and allocating them reasonably among team members according to the allocation mechanism devised by the municipal leading group.

Thirdly, the collaboration mechanisms are clearly defined. These include: (1) Information sharing and communication: establishing an efficient information sharing and communication mechanism between the municipal leadership group and subordinate governance teams to ensure timely transmission and feedback of governance information. The municipal leadership group can regularly convene working meetings to hear work reports from subordinate governance teams and adjust and optimize governance strategies and objectives; (2) Goal alignment: the municipal leadership group and subordinate governance teams jointly set governance goals to ensure goal consistency and collaboration. The municipal leadership group can provide suggested goals based on the actual situations of subordinate governance teams, and subordinate governance teams should fully consider these suggestions when setting specific goals, making reasonable adjustments based on their own actual situations; (3) Point incentive mechanism: incentivizing efficient collaboration between the municipal leadership group and subordinate governance teams through the "governance points for tackling price gouging" system. The municipal leadership group allocates points based on the governance effectiveness of subordinate governance teams, while subordinate governance teams strive for more points by exceeding task requirements and setting reasonable goals. This point incentive mechanism not only promotes collaborative work between upper and lower levels but also stimulates the work enthusiasm and creativity of team members; (4) Supervision and evaluation: the municipal leadership group supervises and evaluates the governance work of subordinate governance teams to ensure effective progress and successful achievement of goals. At the same time, subordinate governance teams should also conduct self-examinations and evaluations of their own work, promptly identify and resolve issues, and improve governance effectiveness. This bidirectional supervision and evaluation mechanism helps form a closed-loop management approach, driving continuous improvement and optimization of governance work.

3.2 Introducing the Concept of “Points for Tackling Tourist Overcharging”

"Points for Tackling Tourist Overcharging" are defined as an integral system with partial monetary attributes issued by the municipal leading group. It aims to evaluate the effectiveness of various governance teams in addressing the issue of tourist overcharging in the tourism market through quantification and provide incentives accordingly.

To ensure the effective implementation and attractiveness of the "Points for Tackling Tourist Overcharging" system, we have specifically set the following key attributes: First, uniqueness and exclusivity: each point is unique and cannot be held simultaneously by multiple entities, ensuring the exclusivity and value of the points. Second, scarcity: points are issued in limited quantities by the municipal regulatory agency to maintain their rarity and attractiveness. Third, non-transferability: to avoid abuse and improper transactions, points cannot be transferred or traded, ensuring the fairness of the entire point system. Fourth, security: advanced encryption technology is used to protect the data security during the generation, distribution, and use of points. Fifth, stability: the regulatory agency will regularly maintain and update the point system to ensure its long-term stable operation.

Points are mainly used in three distributions. The first distribution: based on the effectiveness of the municipal overall governance of tourist overcharging in the market, calculate the points for each subordinate team in the current year and distribute them equally based on the team size, incentivizing competition and cooperation among regions. The second distribution: focusing on the effectiveness of subordinate teams, through the design of excess task completion points and false reporting penalty points, incentivize teams to exceed task completion and set reasonable governance goals. The third distribution: focusing on the differentiated contributions of individuals within the team, through self-evaluation and team voting to select "advanced" or "needs improvement," providing additional rewards or penalties to stimulate team vitality.

3.3 Focus on the First Distribution of the Overall Effectiveness of the City

Firstly, calculate the municipal "Points for Tackling Tourist Overcharging". It is a comprehensive score based on multiple indicators, including but not limited to the qualified rate of random inspections, the absence of tourist overcharging incidents, tourist satisfaction, complaint handling efficiency, market supervision intensity, etc. The calculation formula can be expressed as:

$$P=W\gamma \tag{1}$$

In this formula, (P) represents the "Points for Tackling Tourist Overcharging", (W) represents the comprehensive score of governance effectiveness (calculated by combining the scores and weights of various indicators), and (γ) represents the conversion coefficient, which is used to convert the governance effectiveness into a specific value of "Points for Tackling Tourist Overcharging".

Subsequently, to calculate the first distribution of points (C_1) for the subordinate teams in the current year, the municipal leading group will use the following formula:

$$C_i = [\mu_0(P_t - P_{t-1}) + \mu_1 P_t] / n \quad (2)$$

where:

$(P_t - P_{t-1})$ represents the difference between the points generated from the governance effectiveness in the current year (P_t) and the points generated in the previous year (P_{t-1}).

μ_0 is the distribution coefficient for the difference in points between the current and previous years.

P_t is the total points generated from the governance effectiveness in the current year.

μ_1 is the distribution coefficient for the points generated in the current year.

n is the total number of individuals in the subordinate team.

This formula takes into account both the change in governance effectiveness from the previous year and the absolute level of effectiveness in the current year, adjusting the distribution of points accordingly through the allocation coefficients μ_0 and μ_1 , and then distributing them among the team members based on the team size.

This design is based on the effectiveness of the city-level overall governance of market rip-off behavior, and takes into account the performance of the two years before and after. There are four advantages: First, system optimization. Encouraging both competition and cooperation among regions. The second is to encourage progress: if there is no significant change in the effectiveness of governance in that year, only the accumulation of basic points; If the effectiveness of governance is improved, the points will increase accordingly. Third, it is easy to regulate and control. By adjusting the two coefficients of μ_0 and μ_1 , we can choose whether to encourage promotion or maintain the status quo, so as to effectively control the policy direction and adapt to the governance needs of different periods. Fourth, rarity: the points are divided equally among team members to promote collaboration, avoid false reporting of the number of people, and ensure that the team is efficient and focused.

3.4 Focus on the Second Distribution of Subordinate Team Effectiveness

First, the upper and lower levels jointly determine the target P_{hl} . Suppose that the target suggested by the municipal level to a subordinate team is P_h , and δ is the proportion of the target P_l reported by the subordinate team in the jointly determined target P_{hl} , which can be expressed as

$$P_{hl} = \delta P_h + (1 - \delta) P_l \quad 0 < \delta < 1 \quad (3)$$

Secondly, in order to motivate the subordinate management teams to overfulfill their tasks while supervising them to avoid deliberately underreporting their goals, the supervision incentive score D is introduced. This one mechanism includes two parts: It is to exceed complete task integral D_1 , those teams that are used at award exceeding expectation to finish administrative task; The second is to falsely report the penalty points D_2 , which aims to ensure that the governance objectives reported by each team are in line with the actual ability and avoid setting too low goals.

Assume that the effectiveness score generated by a subordinate governance team in that year is P_{tx} .

In the aspect of completing the task, the excitation integral D_1 is designed, and the excitation coefficient λ_1 is introduced. When the subordinate governance team P_{tx} reaches the established governance target P_{hi} , it will not receive additional incentive points; however, if the team overfulfills the task, that is, the actual performance exceeds the target value, it will receive positive incentive points according to the excess; On the contrary, if they fail to achieve the set goals, they will be punished according to the difference.

$$D_1 = \lambda_1(P_{tx} - P_{hi}) \tag{4}$$

In the aspect of supervising the reasonable reporting target, the penalty integral D_2 is designed and the penalty coefficient λ_2 is introduced. The greater the gap between the actual governance effectiveness of the subordinate governance team and the reported target, the greater the penalty points will be.

$$D_2 = \lambda_2|P_{tx} - P_l| \tag{5}$$

Namely:

$$D = D_1 - D_2 \tag{6}$$

$$D = \lambda_1(P_{tx} - P_{hi}) - \lambda_2|P_{tx} - P_l| \tag{7}$$

The introduction of this supervision and incentive integral mechanism aims to ensure that the county-level slaughter management teams can truly and reasonably set governance objectives, and strive to overfulfill their tasks, so as to effectively improve the effectiveness of the city's slaughter management.

Finally, it is determined that the second distribution integral C_2 can be expressed as the sum of the performance integral P_{tx} of the subordinate governance team in the current year multiplied by the distribution coefficient μ_2 and the supervisory incentive integral D , which is equally distributed to the team “n”.

$$C_2 = (\mu_2 P_{tx} + D) / n \tag{8}$$

Namely:

$$C_2 = [\mu_2 P_{tx} + \lambda_1(P_{tx} - P_{hi}) - \lambda_2|P_{tx} - P_l|] / n \tag{9}$$

There are three advantages: firstly, the municipal leading group can reward the team that overfulfills the task by adjusting the parameter λ_1 to stimulate its enthusiasm; secondly, the municipal leading group can reasonably set and optimize the governance objectives by using the parameter δ and data accumulation; Thirdly, with the help of parameter λ_2 , we can verify the accuracy of the target reported by the subordinate team, prevent false reporting, ensure the authenticity of the data, standardize team behavior and improve the governance effect.

3.5 Focus on the Third Distribution of Individual Performance

The second distribution of points is based on the differences in governance effectiveness among teams, while the third distribution focuses on the differentiated contributions of individuals within the team. Initially, self-evaluation and team voting are conducted to select individuals who are "Outstanding staff" or "staff needing improvement". Subsequently, the formula $C_3 = \mu_3 |P_{tx} - P_{hl}|$ is introduced to implement differentiated allocation of points.

Because it is difficult to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of individual work, we can use the internal implicit supervision mechanism to adopt self-evaluation and team voting to select "Outstanding staff" or "staff needing improvement". When the team reaches the standard ($P_{tx} - P_{hl} \geq 0$), all members will get the second allocation of points, and the "advanced" will get an additional third allocation of "bonus points" C_3 . When the team fails to reach the standard ($P_{tx} - P_{hl} < 0$), the second distribution points obtained by the whole team will be reduced, and a certain amount of points C_3 will be deducted from "to be improved", and this part of points will be transferred to "advanced" as an incentive. Combining the two situations, "advanced" can always get a score of C_3 ; if "to be improved" appears when it is not up to the standard, the score of C_3 will be deducted; other personnel will not get a score, so it can be expressed as:

$$C_3 = f(P_{tx}, P_{hl}, X) = \begin{cases} \mu_3 | P_{tx} - P_{hl}, & \text{Outstanding staff} \\ -\mu_3 | P_{tx} - P_{hl}, & \text{staff needing improvement, } (P_{tx} - P_{hl}) < 0 \\ 0, & \text{other} \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

To sum up, the sum of the three distribution points is:

$$C = C_1 + C_2 + C_3 \quad (11)$$

The formula combines team performance, goal gap and member contribution, aiming to stimulate team motivation, provide scientific quantitative evaluation for cross-departmental collaboration, and curb negative phenomena. It covers three rounds of distribution elements, taking into account team and individual performance, and can accurately calculate the points of each member. Figure 2 shows the design logic.




Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of design logic.

The "three-time allocation" mechanism is shown in Figure 3, and the first round can flexibly decide to improve governance or maintain stability by adjusting the coefficient. The second round of adjustment parameters encourage subordinates to overfulfill their tasks and strengthen target coordination and supervision and evaluation. Three rounds of implementation of differentiated distribution to stimulate team vitality. The mechanism can also fairly evaluate different system personnel, eliminate barriers, achieve scientific cumulative evaluation, ensure stability, and encourage sustained investment.




Fig. 3. Advantage map of allocation mechanism.

4 Effect Simulation and Analysis

This model is not only suitable for the overall governance control and evaluation at the macro level, but also for the evaluation of individual work performance. It can promote cooperation and healthy competition among superiors, subordinates and peers. Here, we mainly take the macro overall governance as an example to simulate and analyze.

To further explore the application methods of the model, an author who has been working on a long-term loan at a city's cultural and tourism bureau, based on their extensive practical experience, has set a series of relevant constants (as shown in Table 1). In practical applications, relevant departments in different regions can flexibly adjust these constants according to their own characteristics. Furthermore, to provide strong support for the application analysis, simulated data reflecting governance effectiveness has been randomly generated as the basis for calculations (see the appendix for detailed data).

Table 1. Constant setting (Based on experience)

Serial number	Constant	Assumed value	Right of setting	Remark
1	γ	100	City leading group	Conversion factor
2	μ_0	0.3	City leading group	For the first time, the proportion of the reward points of the middle and lower management teams in the total change value of the total points produced by the city leading group in that year.
3	μ_1	0.6	City leading group	For the first time, the reward points of the middle and lower management teams accounted for the proportion of the total points generated by the city leading group.
4	δ	0.5	Upper and lower two-level coordination	Second distribution of the proportion of the target P_{II} identified by the subordinate governance team to the jointly identified target P_{III}
5	λ_1	0.8	City leading group	Excitation coefficient of the second distribution
6	λ_2	0.2	City leading group	Penalty factor for the second distribution
7	μ_2	0.5	City leading group	Allocation factor for bonus points in the second allocation
8	μ_3	0.4	City leading group	Bonus/penalty factor in the third distribution

4.1 Overall Regulation (Stable/Aggressive)

Assume that teams 1-3 are the same except for the actual scores in year t-6, and the random assumption data are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Simulation data 1(Randomly generated)

Team	T-7			T-6			Increment
	Actual score	Superior target	Self-reported figures	Synthetic target	Number of people	Actual results	
City leading group	72.85					75.5	
Team 1		93	88	89	10	92	3
Team 2		93	88	89	10	89	0
Team 3		93	88	89	10	85	-3

As shown in Figure 4, when μ_1 is stable at 0.2 and μ_0 increases (from 0.2 to 0.6), everyone will get more scores in the year of t-6, and the more the actual effect increment, the higher the score, which will guide everyone to work harder to improve the increment, that is, the extent of progress.




Fig. 4. Schematic diagram of overall regulation and control.

4.2 Grasp the Governance Situation of the Jurisdiction

Assuming that the data is as shown in Table 3 and the calculated score is as shown in Figure 5, when the C2 value tends to be stable under the continuous collaborative exploration of superiors and subordinates, the actual governance effect value can be considered as the maximum governance effect of the jurisdiction at the current stage. There are many reasons for the fluctuation of data during the period, which can be identified by in-depth analysis of the data. These reasons include the miscalculation of the goal by the superior leadership group or the subordinate governance team, the centralized action of the subordinate governance team in a certain year, and the impact of major changes in the governance team personnel.

Table 3. Data simulation (Randomly generated)

Team	Superior target	Self-reported target	T-7		Actual results
			Synthetic target	Number of people in the team	
City leaders Group					
Team 1	90	85	86	12	87
Team 2	72	67	68	10	80
Team 3	85	80	81	10	70
T-6					
City leaders Group					
Team 1	93	88	89	12	92
Team 2	85	82	82.6	10	83
Team 3	80	73	74.4	10	72
T-5					
City leaders Group					
Team 1	96	92	92.8	12	94
Team 2	86	83	83.6	10	90
Team 3	79	73	74.2	10	73

T-4					
City leaders Group					83.33333
Team 1	99	95	95.8	12	96
Team 2	95	91	91.8	10	79
Team 3	79	74	75	10	75
T-3					
City leaders Group					86.33333
Team 1	98	96	96.4	12	97
Team 2	86	83	83.6	10	84
Team 3	82	76	77.2	10	78
T-2					
City leaders Group					88
Team 1	99	97	97.4	12	98
Team 2	87	84	84.6	10	84
Team 3	85	79	80.2	10	82
T-1					
City leaders Group					93
Team 1	99	98	98.2	12	99
Team 2	87	83	83.8	10	84
Team 3	92	85	86.4	83	86
T					
City leaders Group					89.33333
Team 1	99	98	98.2	12	99
Team 2	88	83	84	10	84
Team 3	86	84	84.4	10	85




Fig. 5. Integral graph.

4.3 Assessment of Governance Team Capabilities

Still with the help of the data in Table 3, the current year score and cumulative score of each team are calculated, and the results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 6.

Table 4. Integral (Calculated)

Team		T-6	T-5	T-4	T-3	T-2	T-1	T
Team 1	That year	730	747.2	763.2	773.6	781.6	790.8	790.8
Team 1	Accumulate	730	1477.2	2240.4	3014	3795.6	4586.4	5377.2
Team 2	That year	660.4	780.4	483.2	668.4	668.4	667.2	666
Team 2	Accumulate	660.4	1440.8	1924	2592.4	3260.8	3928	4594
Team 3	That year	555.6	576.8	594	616.8	648.8	679.6	677.6
Team 3	Accumulate	555.6	1132.4	1726.4	2343.2	2992	3671.6	4349.2

Rom the cumulative situation, we can draw the following conclusions: the govern-ance capacity of team 1 is continuously ahead of team 2, and team 2 is better than team 3. Although the current year score of team 2 exceeds that of team 1 in the year of t-5, team 1 has not been overtaken by the deficit in the long-term cumulative score. It is particularly noteworthy that there was a significant decline in the current year's score of team 2 in t-4, but this fluctuation did not cause a significant change in the cumulative score. This proves that the integral calculated by the model effectively weakens the influence of accidental phenomena on the overall result, thus ensuring the stability and scientificity of the integral.




Fig. 6. Schematic diagram of integral.

4.4 The Role of Reducing Staff and Increasing Efficiency

With the help of the data in Table 3, the score of each person in the current year is calculated as shown in Table 5, which is used to draw Figure 7. It can be seen that although the overall treatment effect of Team 1 is high, because there are more team members, each person gets less points, so it can promote the management team to further reduce staff and increase efficiency.

Table 5. Score (Calculated)

Teams and individuals		T-6	T-5	T-4	T-3	T-2	T-1	T
Team 1 (12)	Advanced	104.3333	108.4333	48.30442	108.6833	109.85	111.55	110.8833
Team 1 (12)	To be improved	102.8333	107.9333	48.20442	108.3833	109.55	111.15	110.4833
Team 1 (12)	Other	102.8333	107.9333	48.20442	108.3833	109.55	111.15	110.4833
Team 2 (10)	Advanced	116.64	136.34	60.5186	119.74	120.44	121.12	120.1
Team 2 (10)	To be improved	116.44	132.84	47.7186	119.54	119.84	121.02	120.1
Team 2 (10)	Other	116.44	132.84	54.1186	119.54	120.14	121.02	120.1
Team 3 (10)	Advanced	107.16	112.98	55.7439	114.78	119.08	122.46	121.56
Team 3 (10)	To be improved	104.76	111.98	55.7439	114.38	118.18	122.06	121.26
Team 3 (10)	Other	105.96	112.48	55.7439	114.38	118.18	122.26	121.26

The above is the macro role analysis. In the micro individual evaluation, referring to the idea of overall evaluation, we can also scientifically realize differentiated evaluation, individual evaluation accumulation, and promote mutual coordination and individual stability efforts. We will not discuss the calculation here.




Fig. 7. Scoring diagram.

5 Challenges, Limitations, and Strategies in Practical Application

When discussing the practical application of the "three-tiered distribution" governance model for team incentive compensation, we must recognize the potential challenges and limitations it faces, and formulate corresponding strategies.

Firstly, the potential challenges mainly lie in four aspects: parameter setting and adjustment, sustainability of the point system, difficulty in cross-department collaboration, and difficulty in data collection and quantitative evaluation. For parameter setting and adjustment, the multiple parameters involved in the model require precise data support and testing optimization, otherwise, they may affect the incentive effect. The strategy is to set parameters reasonably through historical data analysis and pilot testing, and establish a dynamic adjustment mechanism. For the sustainability of the point system, it needs to maintain its attractiveness and stability. We should regularly assess the operation of the system and introduce new incentive methods to maintain the enthusiasm of team members. The difficulty in cross-department collaboration arises from potential coordination of interests and communication barriers. We should establish clear collaboration mechanisms and communication channels, and strengthen information sharing and mutual support. The difficulty in data collection and quantitative evaluation stems from the need to collect data on multiple indicators for evaluating the effectiveness of governance. A unified data collection platform should be established, and the quantitative evaluation index system should be optimized.

Secondly, the limitations of the model are manifested in two aspects. One is the limitation of the model's scope of application. This model is mainly aimed at multi-department collaborative governance issues and may not be applicable to single-department or simple problems. We should select the appropriate governance model based on the characteristics of the problem. The other limitation is the requirement for the quality of team members. The implementation of the model relies on the quality and ability of team members. We should strengthen the training of team members and establish selection and assessment mechanisms.

The key to successfully deploying this model lies in top-level design, policy support, pilot promotion, the establishment of communication and feedback mechanisms, as well as continuous monitoring, evaluation, and dynamic optimization. Through the integrated use of these strategies, we can ensure that the "three-tiered distribution" model exerts its maximum effectiveness in public management practice, thereby promoting the overall improvement of organizational performance.

6 Conclusion

In this study, the application of the "three distributions" model of team incentive compensation in the field of public management, especially in the multi-sectoral collaborative governance of rip-off behavior in the tourism market, is discussed in depth, and a set of practical quantitative framework is constructed. The framework is based on the construction of a two-level organizational structure of rip-off governance, through the

collaborative work of the governance leading group led by the municipal government and the parallel governance front-line team composed of multiple departments at lower levels, the concept of "rip-off governance points" is introduced, and the reward mechanism of hierarchical distribution is combined, which greatly stimulates the enthusiasm of team members and their willingness to cooperate.

This study not only enriches and develops the theory of public management in theory and provides new ideas and tools for the practice of public management, but also provides a useful reference for solving complex social problems such as rip-off behavior in the tourism market in practice. This study believes that through the implementation of the "three distribution" incentive mechanism, combined with simulation data analysis, the interest relationship between the team and the individual is effectively balanced, and the overall governance work regulation, governance capacity evaluation and governance situation evaluation on the macro level, and the individual work performance evaluation on the micro level can show better scientificity, fairness and stability. At the same time, this quantitative score can be converted into the internal annual assessment of the departments involved in the governance action through a certain conversion method, so as to break through the barriers of the departments and facilitate the systematic and integrated governance.

However, this study also recognizes that there are still some limitations and areas for improvement in the practical application of the model. For example, the setting and adjustment of model parameters and the sustainability of the integral system need to be further studied and improved. Future research can further expand the application field of the model and optimize its operation mechanism to meet the governance needs of more public management issues.

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