



National Revolution without Social Revolution; Indonesian Government Policy That Prioritizes Independence

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Abstract. Discourse of oligarchs, socio-economic disparities since the New Order until the reform era often color studies in the both are public sphere and the academic sphere. Uniquely, it is still rare to link the dominant role of the oligarchy to the socio-economic gap in historical perspective, especially a national revolution that is not accompanied by a social revolution. The absence of a “systematic social revolution movement during the course of the national revolution” caused the values of feudalism and the capitalist socio-economic order not to change significantly. The national revolution has not succeeded in carrying out its social ideals. Consequently, the ideals of the nation’s founders to realize political and economic democracy, “socio-democracy” which is full of equality values, in the social, political and economic fields have not been successfully realized.

Keywords: national revolution · social revolution · socio-democracy and equality

1 Introduction

The discourse on the strengthening of the oligarchy in the reform era, both in public discourse and in academic discourse is interesting to see from a historical perspective (Wibowo, 2010; Kusman, 2017). The strength of the oligarchic group in making political policies in Indonesia in this reform era is actually not something new. In the colonial era, since the implementation of “Open Door Politics” at the end of the nineteenth century, the oligarchic power has been quite influential in various political and economic policies in Indonesia. Even if the Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC) organization was seen as an alliance of businessmen – not mere representatives of the Dutch royal government – then corporations and oligarchs who have played a role in political policy have been around for a long time, namely since the VOC colonized several areas in the archipelago. The oligarchic group also influenced the implementation of a capitalist economy that embraced the feudal (indigenous elite) with an indirect government system, indirect rule.

“Indigenous” people experience marginalization in the economic field (as well as politically and socially due to discriminatory, segregation and exploitative regulations). Very few manage to become successful entrepreneurs and traders. As a

consequence, the middle group in the archipelago that comes from indigenous peoples was very limited. According to Anthony Reid (2011; 5) “*Although profound changes occurred during the three centuries the Dutch were in the archipelago, they were in the direction of isolating Indonesia’s people from the more important effects of capitalism*”.

Consequently, when there was an opportunity to try to build their social ideals – in the early 1950s through the policy of the Economic Urgency Plan (RUP) which was one of the mainstays of the “Benteng Program” – to support indigenous entrepreneurs in dealing with foreign and Chinese businessmen-, the indigenous people were not ready. They tend to be rent-seeking entrepreneurs. Muhaimin quoted Boeke’s opinion about the “*pre-capitalist mentality*” which was still dominant among the natives. Boeke ignores the discriminatory and segregation social structure and does not provide opportunities for indigenous people to develop their economic potential (Muhaimin, 1990).

The atmosphere of social, economic and political life which was influenced by the dominance of the oligarchy and corporations raises the concerns of the figures of the national movement. Some of them even try to create conceptual ideas as a counter-concept to the order. Tan Malaka in his book *De Naar Republik*, clearly describes the struggle that seeks to create an order of political life that is sovereign by the people after Indonesia’s independence. Mohammad Hatta in his 1932 writing, “Towards an Independent Indonesia” which was later used as a guide for “Indonesian National Education” (PNI) explicitly stated that both of are political democracy and economic democracy must be carried out simultaneously to create a just order; “*It is no longer a single person or a small group that has to control the livelihoods of many people...*” (Pane, 2015; 137).

The concerns and hopes expressed by Moh. Hatta also emphasized Sukarno. In his article “Achieving an Independent Indonesia” which was first published in 1933, it was stated that “... *an independent Indonesia is only a bridge, even if it is a golden bridge, which must be traversed with all vigilance and discipline, lest someone else but marhaen. Across the bridge the road splits into two; one to the world of marhaen’s misery, one to the world of marhaen’s salvation; one to the same-wailing-equal-crying world, one to the same-equal-feeling world. Woe to you marhaen, when the train goes up on the first road, towards the realms of Indonesian capital and Indonesian bourgeoisie! Therefore, marhaen beware! Take care that the chariot of victory will remain in your control, guard that which political power will fall into your hands, in your iron fist, in your iron’s hand*” (Sukarno; 2014: 449). In various other writings, Soekarno continues to strive for “*socio-nationalism*” and “*socio-democracy*” as concepts to knit unity and socio-economic justice for the Indonesian people, who since the colonial period underwent a process of “pauperization” as a “*marhaen*” group. (Soekarno, 1965) Even “*socio-democracy*” together with “*socio-nationalism*” was declared by Sukarno in 1933 as “principles” that must be adhered to. “*It’s not only now that we hold on to “socio-nationalism” and “socio-democracy”, but until after Indonesia’s independence, until after imperialism-capitalism is gone, yes “until the end of the world” we continue to be based on socio-nationalism and socio-democracy*”. (Sukarno; 2005: 249).

The hopes and ideals of the movement’s figures have become a collective discourse among the majority of the nation’s founders. One of these indications can be seen from the struggle of ideas in the Dokuritsu Zunbi Coosokai trial, the Investigative Agency

for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPK) and the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI). In addition to agreeing to make Pancasila the basic philosophy of the state whose ultimate goal is to achieve a just and prosperous society (the realization of the fifth precept, Social justice for all Indonesian people), at the second plenary session of the BPUPK (10–17 July) through voting they chose the form of a republic instead of a monarchy (Latif, 2017, Kusuma, 2016).

Uniquely, during the national revolution, efforts to fight for social transformation in accordance with “the ideals of the nation’s founders” did not become the main/dominant political current. Consequently, the national revolution has no implications for significant changes in the socioeconomic order (Reid, 2011). This condition makes Indonesia’s post-revolutionary political economy still strongly influenced by corporations which are then intertwined with oligarchic powers robbing the people’s socio-economic sovereignty (Wibowo, 2005). This condition caused the reforms that occurred in Indonesia in 1998 to be easily carried out by the power of corporations and oligarchs in the form of a “Kudeta Putih” (“white coup”) so that Indonesia was increasingly entangled in the octopus of oligarchic power (Hadi and dkk. , 2012).

This paper seeks to explore the reasons for the failure (delay) of the social revolution during the national revolution. Why did the social revolution not become the dominant current during the national revolution so as to have the consequence of maintaining the power of the oligarchy and corporations which only underwent metamorphosis without causing radical changes in the socio-economic structure of Indonesian society.

2 Focus on the Netherlands

After the proclamation, the Indonesian government faced harsh political and military realities. Politically and militarily the Japanese army was still strong and in power throughout the archipelago. Japan’s military position as a war-losing country was still strong because it received a mandate from the Allies to maintain the status quo until the Allies arrived in Indonesia. On the night of August 16, when Hatta and colleagues wanted to hold a meeting at the Indies hotel, it could not be held because there was already a ban from the Japanese authorities. Even when Moh. Hatta and Sukarno met with Somubochu publicly stating that Indonesian leaders should not hold any more meetings. “*What can we do, we have surrendered to the Allies and now we are only tools of the Allies. The allies ordered to maintain the status quo, no further changes were allowed*” (Yasni, 1980; 140–1).

In the global constellation, the Indonesian elite also realized that the Allies still wanted to maintain the global political order as before the world war. Moh. Hatta reiterated in a speech on August 18, 1947 in Bukittinggi that the proclamation of Indonesia’s independence caused difficulties for the international community; “*because at the Conference of the United States in San Francisco in June 1945, when establishing the United Nations (UN), the Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia was recognized, even though it made conditions regarding its obligations to the Indonesian people*” (Ananda & Siregar, 2000: 67).

They realized that based on the “Atlantic charter” dated August 14, 1941, the Allies were trying to maintain the political order before World War II. The Atlantic Charter

which was signed by the American president... and British Prime Minister Churchill who later became the basis for the Allies in regulating the global order after World War II in paragraph 2 is expressly stated that *“they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned”*. (Yamin, 1958; 22).

Mohammad Yamin who in the era of the national revolution was in the opposition line with Tan Malaka Cs. States that the national revolution also requires the formation of a new independent and sovereign society, namely “a society free from the bonds of feudalism, colonialism and imperialism... The political revolution which has brought about the Republic of Indonesia under the central, regional and subordinate governments, to experience and go hand in hand with the social revolution, which will destroy feudal and bourgeois society and later give rise to a scumbag power which dominates the dialectical formation of the state and society according to the production and production of socialism. The social revolution that will come will be the Indonesian proletarian revolution” (1958: 5).

In the global political Indonesia was still considered as an inventory (“inventaris”) owned by the colonial state as in previous historical events. In 1811 the Dutch ceded Indonesian territory to the British. Then in 1816 England handed it back to the Dutch. And in 1942 the Dutch handed Indonesia over to the Japanese. These events want to be repeated by the imperialist powers. However, the Indonesian people have a high political awareness. Before the imperialist powers carried out the “handover of Indonesia” they had proclaimed themselves as an independent nation free from foreign colonialism. *“People were surprised that the inventory suddenly proclaimed itself as an independent country and which wanted to determine its destiny on its own strength and will”* (Simatupang, 1981: 137–8). As a sovereign nation, Indonesia is no longer a colony of other countries, including the Dutch colony. The national revolution was oriented to defend Indonesia’s independence from foreign intervention, especially the Dutch kingdom which wanted to colonize Indonesia again.

Facing the political and military realities at the national and global levels, most of the government elites choose a relatively moderate path. The choice to gain sympathy from the international community became the main political policy. The government chose the way of diplomacy in the face of the Allied powers with the Dutch who wanted to return to power in Indonesia.

In their opinion, Indonesia will be strong and have a high bargaining position when the unity of all elements of the nation can be mobilized to support the proclamation of Indonesian independence. Conflicts between elements of society, including between classes, were tried to be eliminated during the national revolution so that the Dutch would not take advantage of them to divide and weaken the Indonesian people in defending their independence.

The perception of the national revolution that cannot be carried out simultaneously with the social revolution causes the government to be reluctant to support the “social revolution movement”. Social movements in some areas do not receive support from the central government. Sjahrir’s cabinet acted decisively against the upheavals of the three regions (Tegal, Brebes and Peralang) by taking military and political actions to end it (Sastrosatomo, 1987; Lucas, 1989). The central government tried to quell violent

political upheavals, “social revolutions” in various areas of Java and Sumatra where the civil service elite and the nobility were the targets of anger (Cribb, 1990; 5).

When there was upheaval or social revolution in the regions, the central government tries to stop it for various technical and pragmatic reasons. Political figures who was known to have a commitment to changing social structures also try to stop the social revolution.

“Amir Syarifuddin considered the social revolution to be the second stage after the national revolution, and considered “left radicalism a childish disease”. Sjahrir, the proponent of the social democratic revolution, proved weak in defending it after it actually happened, perhaps because it was felt that it would reduce the world’s confidence in the authority of his cabinet in controlling law and order in this young republic. Sukarno tended to think that the Three Regions were affected by “separatism”, and Hatta saw it as an excess because there was too much sovereignty of the people” (Lucas; 1989; 295).

The social upheaval which was also often categorized as a social revolution in East Sumatra which at the local level succeeded in overthrowing the feudal power structure was finally stopped by the central government. At first the feudal group did not support the proclamation of Indonesian independence and preferred to support the return of Dutch rule. The feudal attitude caused the republican groups, especially supporters of Tan Malaka to be restless and angry. They oppose the diplomacy policy run by Sjahrir. Dissatisfaction Tan Malaka Cs held a meeting in Purwokerto to hold a “People’s Congress” by forming the Volksfront (people’s front) on January 3, 1946. Then on January 15–16, 1946, it was followed up with a meeting in Solo which was changed to “Per-satuan Perjuangan”. As a result of this movement the PKI, Masyumi and PNI made a vote of no confidence (*mosi tidak percaya*) in BP-KNIP on 16 February 1946. On 23 February 1946 Sjahrir resigned and the first Sjahrir Cabinet fell. (Sastroatomo, 1987: 222–3; Agung, 1985; 21–22).

The central government, represented by the Minister of Defense Amir Syarifuddin, managed to “embrace them” and stop the social revolution that had caused casualties. Through the diplomacy carried out by Amir Syarifuddin against the leaders of the social revolution and followed up with the formation of the Indonesian National Committee for the whole of Sumatra, finally the social revolution in East Sumatra was successfully ended. (Sastroamidjojo, 1974: 201).

Vice President Mohammad Hatta in a radio speech on August 17, 1946 firmly stated that; “... *Our goal at this time is to perfect the independence of our country, so that it will gain international recognition. All efforts and energies are directed towards it... That is why the path of our revolution has a certain character. With the proclamation of the independence of the Indonesian people on August 17 and by drawing up a constitution based on popular sovereignty and collectivism, we are actually going through two kinds of revolutions; national revolution and social revolution. But because the two types of revolution cannot be carried out simultaneously and in parallel, at this time the national revolution is prioritized*” (Ananda & Siregar. 2000: 123).

Sjahrir, who in the early days of the national revolution occupied a dominant position as prime minister, also became the main advocate for the completion of the national

revolution through diplomacies. The national revolution could be resolved through negotiations with the Dutch with international supervision. This was also to “widen the battlefield” from internal problems or as a domestic problem for the Netherlands – as the Netherlands often claims – to become an international problem, namely between the Indonesian state and the Dutch state. Consequently, in facing the choice of national revolution or social revolution, Sjahrir prioritized the national revolution. *“Although Sjahrir recognizes the need for both, he is also aware of the reality of the situation and gives the highest priority to the first objective. The main reason is that independence is a goal shared by the whole nation, while social revolution is not the case”* (Soedjatmoko, 1990; 283).

During the national revolution, the government’s political energy was more focused on maintaining the existence of the republic through diplomacy. Indeed, the diplomatic path of the republic’s position was getting weaker and narrower. The territory of Indonesia, which since the proclamation has been described as covering the area of Sabang to Merauke and during the Soekarno-Hatta cabinet was divided into 7 provinces, experienced a significant decline. Based on the Linggarjati agreement, Indonesia’s territory was only limited to Java and Sumatra. Recognition of power controlled by the Republic was narrowed in the Renville agreement. And during the round table conference, the “republic area” was only limited to the Yogyakarta residency area because the Dutch were increasingly successful in forming “puppet states” or federal in various regions.

Although the territory of the Republic of Indonesia was getting narrower, the “republican authority” as part of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia has a high position. Indonesia’s position no longer depends solely on the territory it controls, but there was a “de jure” acknowledgment of the UN Security Council and the international community as conveyed by Hatta as prime minister in front of BP KNIP on 19 July 1949 (Ananda & Siregar, 2000; 256). Ahead of the KMB, international support, including the United States, was getting stronger so that the Dutch could no longer ignore the existence of the Republic of Indonesia. After the KMB, the President and Prime Minister of the RIS were held by the republic’s proclaimer, Ir. Soekarno and Drs. Mohammad Hatta.

The Linggarjati, Renville and KMB agreements made the Indonesian government unable to get out of the “border situation” in order to realize 100% independence as proclaimed by the United Struggle at the beginning of the national revolution. The national revolution that was successfully ended through diplomacy, namely the KMB, caused the aspiration to make changes to the social structure, namely the social revolution, not yet realized. The ideals of social revolution in changing the structure of society that are not dominated by feudalism (the aristocrats) and owners of capital (the bourgeoisie) face formidable challenges. People who have obtained a sovereign position in political democracy need to be balanced with sovereignty in the economic field. According to Soekarno, true democracy always seeks political and economic order, namely “socio-democracy” (2005: 173).

3 No Command and Blueprint

Since the beginning of the national movement, there were no political parties in Indonesia that built and had troops to guard and fight for their political ideals. This was different

from the revolutions that occurred in China and Vietnam (Zhou, 2019, Tsidel, 2021). The Dutch colonial government did not provide space for Indonesian fighters to build military strength. Likewise, during the Japanese occupation, the development of semi-military forces was directly controlled by the Japanese and did not allow the formation of political-military power among the fighters.

Even after the proclamation, the government “still hesitated” to form a military force as a state defense institution. The still strong Japanese troops on the one hand and the influence of the Allies in the international political arena as the winners of the second world war made the Indonesian political elite try to fight for independence peacefully through diplomacy.

PPKI on August 22, 1945 announced the establishment of the “Badan Helping Families of War Victims” whose organization was often called the People’s Security Agency (BKR). From the name of the institution, it was clear that there was no association with a military figure whose job was to defend the existence of a country from outside attacks. The BKR, which was then dominated by former PETA youth groups (in Java) and Giyugun (in Sumatra) were still relatively disciplined and felt themselves part of the government compared to “volunteers” who organized themselves as lascars who tended to be reluctant to accept instructions from the government. The formation of the BKR that has emerged in various regions is quite dynamic. However, because the formation process was not based on a military organizational structure for defense, there was no centralized command. It was only after BKR was changed on October 5, 1945 to the People’s Security Army (TKR) that the command structure began to appear even though its existence as a military force was more focused on maintaining internal security rather than defense aspects against external enemies.

However, the government has not yet established the posts of Commander of the Army and Minister of Security. TKR leader Oerip Soemohardjo then initiated a meeting with TKR leaders at the division commander level and TKR regiment to hold a meeting and elect the TKR Commander at his headquarters in Yogyakarta on November 12, 1945. The election for the commander was carried out in the style of political democracy instead of a command system, giving rise to the name Colonel Sudirman as commander of the TKR (Sundhaussen, 1988).

The government’s political policies that are not fast and firm have caused the military and government relations to be less well established. Even among the military, the perception emerged as if the Indonesian military was a military that emerged and was formed from the people, not by the government. Various political tensions between the leadership of the TNI and the government, especially in the lead-up to and ongoing diplomacy with the Dutch, added to the impression that the Indonesian military was difficult to move the government to participate and be responsible for realizing the social revolution. It was not uncommon for military leaders to be closer to the opposition than to government policies (Hariyono, 2014). This condition was certainly different from the revolutions that occurred in China and Vietnam, where the military was an integral part of the government, including in carrying out social revolutions. This condition also influenced the government’s failure to realize the social revolution after the national revolution. The emergence of the tendency of the Indonesian military elite in the period of

parliamentary democracy, guided democracy and even in the New Order Era collaborating with corporate powers (Hariyono, 2008) may also be influenced by the background of the TNI's political struggle in the revolutionary period which is relatively sterile from the discourse and struggle of the social revolution.

4 Conclusion

The national revolution that took place from mid-1945 to the end of 1949 greatly influenced the existence of Indonesia, especially social, political, and economic life in the aftermath. The political struggle that was intertwined with diplomacy and military struggle as its support ended up at the negotiating table, namely the KMB. The results of the KMB as a result of an agreement between the republics, the federal state and the kingdom of the Netherlands did not all benefit Indonesia.

One of the adverse consequences for Indonesia occurred in the economic sector. Apart from that, Indonesia has to bear the debt burden of three million guilders as well as the responsibility to take part in maintaining foreign property rights, both belonging to the Dutch kingdom and foreign private companies in Indonesia. The dominance of foreign companies and industries has resulted in no change in the social structure after the national revolution. The government from the beginning of the revolution prioritized the national revolution that prioritized the independence of the Indonesian territory and tried to delay changes in the social structure. Uniquely, the delay (failure?) of the social revolution during the national revolution caused the oligarchic power to grow and dominate the political and economic order in the future. For this reason, a study of the parliamentary democratic system in the 1950s era which explicitly implemented a fortress program to make socio-economic structural changes, until a guided democratic government that tried to carry out national universal development also failed to realize a social revolution. Likewise, the New Order government, which from the beginning chose a developmentalist style of economic development and gave room for the growth and development of political-economic oligarchic powers, made government control more vulnerable.

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